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Abstract 
Lack of public support is regarded as a major barrier for implementing restrictive transport 
policy instruments. Recent studies have therefore analyzed factors explaining variations in public 
support and examined strategies to increase support of restrictive policy measures. However, few 
have analyzed whether there is an actual relationship between transportation policies and 
political legitimacy. This article thus makes two main contributions to the literature. First, it 
explores whether there is a relationship between support of restrictive instruments and political 
legitimacy to study the political implications of introducing such instruments. The results show 
that citizens opposing restrictive measures, such as local road tolls, are more dissatisfied with the 
performance of local democracy. The effect also appears to be mediated through citizens 
evaluation of politicians’ and how they evaluate governmental performance at the local level. 
Second, the article analyzes the importance of transportation policies in particular for local 
political legitimacy. The results show that citizens dissatisfied with the quality of services within 
the transport sector are also more dissatisfied with the performance of local democracy. 
Keywords: acceptance; transport policy; restrictive instruments; toll cordon system; satisfaction 
with democracy; political legitimacy   
1. Introduction 
This article contributes to the literature on acceptance and support for restrictive policy 
instruments by analyzing the relationship between political legitimacy and the use of such 
instruments. While most studies have focused on measuring opposition or explaining variations 
in support (Eliasson, 2014; Eliasson and Jonsson, 2011; Hårsman and Quigley, 2010; Albalate 
and Bel, 2009; Börjesson et al., 2016; Schade and Baum, 2007), few have analyzed whether there 
is an actual relationship between opposition towards restrictive instruments and satisfaction with 
democracy. 
According to Salamon (2002:24), “tool choice can affect the overall sense of legitimacy that 
government enjoys in the eyes of the citizens”. While these claims may be theoretically well-
founded, there are few articles that empirical analyze whether the implementation of unpopular 
instruments have any impact on political legitimacy. This is an important field of study since 
scholars have argued that when citizens have positive attitudes towards the political system they 
are less likely to push for radical changes (Bernauer and Vatter, 2012:435). It is therefore 
important to understand the mechanisms explaining citizens’ satisfaction with how democracy 
works and, in doing so, to analyze the importance of transportation policies for political 
legitimacy. Thus, the purpose of this article is to analyze if, and how, the use of specific policy 
instruments in the transportation sector can influence satisfaction with democracy (Bemelmans-
Videc et al., 2011). 
This is an especially relevant topic considering the challenges governments face in seeking to 
achieve targets for reducing GHG-emissions. Congestion and emissions from transport are 
frequently mentioned as examples of wicked problems. Use of restrictive policy instruments is 
commonly seen as necessary in order to address many of the negative consequences associated 
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with such problems (Börjesson et al., 2012). But congestion pricing and tolls have proven to be 
highly controversial instruments which meet fierce public and political opposition in many cities 
(Rye et al., 2008; Eliasson and Jonsson, 2011; Börjesson and Kristoffersson, 2015). The lack of 
public, and hence political, support has therefore been suggested as a main reason for why such 
instruments are not adopted and introduced (Santos, 2008). 
This article also contributes to the literature on political legitimacy. First, although there are 
several studies analyzing political legitimacy at the local and regional level (e.g. Rose and 
Pettersen, 2009b, 2000, 1999; Weitz-Shapiro, 2008; Vetter, 2007), few have analyzed the specific 
role and importance of transportation policies. This is especially important since, according to 
Wagner et al. (2009), we still lack knowledge on ‘what drives subjective perceptions of 
satisfaction with democracy’. In the Nordic countries, municipals exercise substantial influence 
over policies relevant to peoples’ satisfaction with local democracy (Denters and Rose, 2005). 
The performance of subnational levels of government in these countries is thus likely to play a 
key role for citizens’ evaluations of democracy, especially considering the fact that lower levels of 
government have a crucial impact on policies regarding transport quality and transport 
instruments. When citizens in Norway were asked about the most important issue for their vote 
in the most recent local election, for example, land-use, toll roads and transportation were 
ranked as the most important issues together with schools, environment and amalgamation 
issues.1 
The article therefore aims at shedding light on why citizens are satisfied with governmental 
performance by including citizens’ viewpoints on the use of restrictive instruments, as well as 
citizens’ evaluation of transport quality. In doing so, the article responds to the call from 
Marsden and Reardon (2017) who criticize the ‘technical-rational model within the 
transportation literature’ while important questions, such as for instance political legitimacy, have 
largely been ignored. 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review of 
factors influencing satisfaction with democracy. Explanatory factors identified in the literature 
are then used to develop a set of hypotheses. Literature regarding policy instruments is also 
included. In Section 3 the dataset used to address the hypotheses is then presented. Ordinary 
least squares regression and mediation analysis following Imai et al. (2011) are used to analyze 
mechanisms explaining variation in satisfaction with democracy. Finally, the last section discusses 
the findings and implications from the analysis. 
2. Literature 
Political legitimacy has deep roots within political philosophy (e.g. Hobbes, 1994; Mill, 1998; 
Rawls, 1971; Kant, 1999; Weber, 1978) yet it is a concept difficult and problematic to define 
(Rothstein, 2009:312).2 In general, political legitimacy is multi-dimensional in nature (Beetham, 
1991). This was famously exemplified in Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg address when he coined 
                                                 
1 The question was the following: “Could you mention the most important issue for personally when you voted in 
the municipal election this year?”. The top eight issues were the following: Schools (9%), environment (6%) 
transportation (5%), municipal amalgamation (5%), care for the elderly (4%), health and social welfare (4%), 
economy, taxes and toll roads (4%), land-use/city development (4%). N = 1190. The data are gathered from 
“Lokalvalgundersøkelsen 2015”. Institute for Social Research and Statistics Norway made the data available but are 
not responsible for any of the analyses or interpretations. 
2 This is not the place for a more comprehensive account of developments regarding political legitimacy. For 
interested readers, see e.g. Beetham (1991), Beetham and Lord (1998), Habermas (1979), Dahl (1989), Norris (1999). 
With reference to (political) legitimacy Beetham (1991:15-16), for instance, state that “power can be legitimate to the 
extent that (i) it conforms to established rules, (ii) the rules can be justified by reference to beliefs shared by both 
dominant and subordinate, and (iii) there is evidence of consent by subordinate to the particular power relation. 
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the well-known ‘government of the people, by the people, for the people’. He thereby illustrated 
three dimensions of political legitimacy. 
Within the literature on political legitimacy, David Easton’s work (1965) is a common theoretical 
and analytic starting point for many. In this work Easton distinguishes three forms of political 
support: support for the political community, regime and authority respectively. This 
classification highlights the multi-dimensional aspect of political legitimacy based on what is 
often referred to as specific and diffuse support. Specific support refers to support for a 
particular government, party, politician, decision or actions, while diffuse support refers to 
support for the political system more generally as, for instance, the norms and rules found in that 
particular country or municipality. Dalton (1999) has later extended this operationalization of 
political evaluation into five categories; political community, regime principles, regime 
performance, regime institutions and political actors. Table 1, which in large part is based on the 
work of Norris (1999), illustrates how the different categories are defined and operationalized. 
These levels can be understood as a scale of citizens evaluation of political support along an axis 
varying from specifictodiffuse support (Norris, 1999). ‘Political community’ and ‘regime 
principles’ are factors representing more abstract or diffuse support of democratic ideals and 
democratic principles. One typical way to operationalize ‘regime principles’ is e.g. pose the 
following statement and ask for respondent’s agreement: “Democracy has it weaknesses but is 
better than any other form of government”. Support for ‘political actors’, on the other hand, 
involves an evaluation of e.g. specific politicians or a government. The implications of 
experiencing a loss in public support are thus expected to vary greatly between these different 
dimensions (Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2014). Experiencing a loss in citizens’ evaluation of 
democratic ideals can be grave since citizens might require constitutional reforms or accept of 
new forms of government. Experiencing a loss of public support for a particular government, on 
the other hand, can be less severe inasmuch as elections for example may offer an opportunity 
for changes in the government. 
Support for democratic values and principles have traditionally been strong in the Nordic 
countries (Dahlberg et al., 2015). Thus, it is less likely that the nature of local transportation 
policies will have a significant impact on support for the principles of democracy. Similarly, 
transportation policies are expected to have low influence on general feelings of belonging to the 
local community. Use of restrictive instruments and perceived quality of transport may 
nonetheless constitute important factors for evaluating governmental performance and thereby 
satisfaction with how local democratic processes functions (Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2014). In 
terms of the model displayed in Table 1, this implies assessing regime performance. 
‘Satisfaction with democracy’ is a widely used indicator for analyzing regime performance (cf. 
Norris, 1999; Linde and Ekman, 2003; Leiter and Clark, 2015; Hobolt, 2012; Huang et al., 2008; 
Curini et al., 2012; Wagner et al., 2009; Armingeon and Guthmann, 2014; Sanders et al., 2014; 
Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Blais and Gélineau, 2007; Aarts and Thomassen, 2008). There is, 
however, disagreement about its exact meaning and interpretation. On the one hand Canache et 
al. (2001) argue that satisfaction with de-mocracy measures multiple dimensions of political 
support and that the question is highly sensitive to differences across nations and individuals. 
Linde and Ekman (2003), on the other hand, argue that satisfaction with democracy measures 
the level of support for the way democracy works in terms of performance rather than 
measuring support for input features such as democratic principles compared to nondemocratic 
forms of government, or satisfaction with specific actors. It is this latter interpretation which the 
present article aims at measuring. 
 4 
 
Table 1. Conceptualization of political support (based on Norris, 1999:10) 
 
 
 
2.1 Determinants of satisfaction with (local) democracy 
Two standard models of regime support, input and output models respectively, are used as a 
frame of reference for addressing the research question. The input model focuses on democratic 
processes and institutions (Dahl, 1989; Easton, 1957, 1965) while the output model refers to the 
importance of policy output and policy outcome for political support (Rothstein, 2009; 
Magalhães, 2014; Dahlberg et al., 2015; Scharpf, 1999). 
2.1.1 The input (procedural) model of satisfaction with democracy 
One important dimension explaining satisfaction with democracy is related to democratic 
processes (Lijphart, 1999; Bernauer and Vatter, 2012). Democratic content or discontent is 
connected to citizens’ evaluations of being represented in the political arena and having their 
voices heard (Norris, 1999). Citizens need to regard political processes and the political system as 
fair and honest (Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2014). The legitimacy of the political system is likely 
to be reduced if citizens feel that the political institutions do not represent their views or if they 
perceive their political representatives to be dishonest or incompetent. This aspect is captured by 
analyzing whether citizens think their views are well represented by politicians and whether 
citizens evaluate politicians as being honest and fair. Taken together, the literature suggests the 
following hypotheses: 
H1. Individuals having confidence in politicians are more likely to be satisfied with how local 
democracy works. 
H2. Individuals who think that the city council represents what people think are more likely to 
be satisfied with how local democracy works. 
2.1.2 The output (performance) model of satisfaction with democracy  
Several authors have likewise documented a relation between better performance and more 
positive evaluations of democracy, although there is no agreement on how performance should 
be measured. Performance is a multi-dimensional concept which en-compasses both political 
and economic aspects. While most articles analyzing the effect of governmental performance use 
economic variables such as the rate of unemployment, inflation and economic growth, some 
authors also link performance to issues as political salience and level of corruption (Bowler and 
Karp, 2004; Leiter and Clark, 2015). 
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Local authorities in Scandinavia enjoy strong local autonomy (Loughlin et al., 2012) and have 
considerable influence on transport and land-use issues. Among other things municipals are 
responsible for local roads, parking policies and land-use development while regional authorities 
are responsible for public transport services and regional roads.3 Local authorities consequently 
play a crucial role when it comes to the adoption of (restrictive) instruments influencing the 
quality of transport within the region, as well as the prioritization of infrastructure projects. It is 
therefore possible to distinguish between general and specific performance at the local level. 
General performance is linked to how citizens evaluate the overall quality of services in the 
municipality (Erkel and Meer, 2016; Rohrschneider, 2005) while specific support is in the present 
case linked to how citizens evaluate the local transport accessibility and municipal land-use 
development. 
The relevant hypotheses are consequently: 
H3. Individuals satisfied with the overall quality of services are more likely to be satisfied with 
local democracy (general performance). 
H4. Individuals satisfied with the quality of transport are more likely to be satisfied with local 
democracy (specific performance). 
2.1.3 The role of instruments for satisfaction with local democracy  
The choice of policy instruments is a vital part of local governance performance, and 
instruments are not politically neutral 
(Peters, 2002; Salamon, 2002). Potentially, therefore, the adoption and implementation of a given 
instrument can have significant consequences for perceived political performance and hence 
political legitimacy (Schneider and Ingram, 1990; Salamon, 2002). 
From such a viewpoint the selection and use of specific policy instruments may be subject to 
what in the literature is identified as ideological congruence between citizens and politicians 
(Kim, 2009). Previous research has largely used the left-right scale as an indicator for analyzing 
congruence. But as Stecker and Tausendpfund (2016) note, this provides only an incomplete 
understanding of political preferences and ideological congruence. Policy preferences are far 
more differentiated and multi-dimensional phenomenon (Stecker and Tausendpfund, 2016). 
Different issues are important for different people and the left-right scale does not fully capture 
the political differences across all policy fields. 
In this respect support for local toll roads provide a better indicator of how perceptions of 
specific policy instruments may influence satisfaction with local democracy. In Norway most 
citizens are affected by toll roads since a majority own cars (Christiansen et al., 2016) and hence 
are subject to paying tolls when using their cars. The largest cities have in particular had a 
relatively long-term history of congestion pricing and use of toll rings. In Bergen, for instance, 
the first toll cordon system was established in 1986 (Engebretsen et al., 2017) while in Oslo and 
Trondheim tolls were introduced in 1990 and 1991 respectively (Bekken and Osland, 2005). 
These toll cordon systems have subsequently been expanded several times with the creation of 
new toll stations and new rates to finance local roads and public transport. These developments 
have been a highly salient topic of public debate. They are regularly discussed in local 
newspapers and between local political parties. Thus, most people living in these cities are likely 
to have a reasonably well informed opinion on the matter. Arguably, therefore, road tolls 
represent a policy area that is well suited for an investigation of the consequences of 
controversial long-term policy choices. 
                                                 
3 However, the national level is responsible for national roads, train infrastructure and train services. 
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I therefore hypothesize the following: 
H5. Individuals opposing toll roads are less likely to be satisfied with democracy. 
2.1.4 Other hypotheses identified in the literature 
In a somewhat related fashion a winner versus loser hypothesis states that citizens who voted for 
the winning side are more inclined to be satisfied with democracy since they are more likely to 
see policy choices as being more in keeping with their own political preferences. There are 
numerous studies documenting such a relationship (Curini et al., 2012; Chang et al., 2014; Blais 
and Gélineau, 2007; Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Anderson and Tverdova, 2001; Singh et al., 
2012; Reher, 2016). Winners also express higher trust of parties or politicians that are in 
government (Blais and Gélineau, 2007). This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H6. Individuals feeling attachment to the parties in government are more likely to be satisfied 
with local democracy. 
Lastly, previous research has not found a clear effect of education. It can potentially have both 
positive and negative effects. For instance, education can presumably generate skepticism 
towards specific political answers and policies, but it can also increase citizens’ knowledge and 
appreciation of the complicated nature that characterize many of today’s societal challenges. 
Political interest may also be associated with satisfaction with democracy (Sanders et al., 2014). 
Just as for education, the same logic applies with respect to being politically interested or being 
informed on local politics through reading local news. Mass media can frame issues in a negative 
or sensational way, but they can also increase readers’ understanding of local politics and make 
them better equipped to assess local governmental performance. This leads to two contrasting 
hypotheses: 
H7a. Individuals who are informed and interested in politics are more likely to be satisfied with 
local democracy. 
H7b. Individuals who are informed and interested in politics are less likely to be satisfied with 
local democracy. 
Fig. 1 provides an illustration of the analytic model used in the next section. The figure is a 
summary of the hypotheses identified in the literature review and the relationships between the 
variables as they are usually are treated in the literature. Four main determinants of satisfaction 
with democracy described by H1 to H7 are included and, in addition, three general predictors 
(age, sex and education) are included among the individual and contextual factors as control 
variables. The figure thereby illustrates a straightforward model for an analysis of the direct 
effects and functions as a point of departure for the regressions reported in Table 3.4 
Figure 1. Model specification for direct effects.  
                                                 
4 Although it is likely that several of the independent variables could influence other dimensions of political support, 
this article is limited to the effect on regime performance. Moreover, while theoretically interesting, the dataset does 
not allow for consideration of whether the dependent variable (satisfaction with how local democracy works) 
influences the other dimensions of political support. In Section 4.3, a more complicated model is used for analyzing 
mediation effects in order to account for interaction between the input and output aspects of political support. 
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3. Data and measurement 
Citizens in the three largest cities in Norway Oslo, Bergen and Trondheim, were recruited 
through a representative web panel. The questionnaire measured attitudes towards how local 
democracy works and captured the inhabitants’ views on local governments performance and 
quality, as well as views on the use of selected transportation policy instruments. A total of 6443 
persons aged 18 or above were invited to participate during March of 2017 and 48% (3072 
persons) completed the survey. The sample(s) were later weighted for age, gender and 
geography. The appendix provides information about the questions included in the analysis and 
the coding of each variable. 
3.1 Dependent variable 
The respondents were asked ‘How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way in which local 
democracy works in your municipality’. 
3.2 Independent variables 
First, to analyze the input dimension, respondents were asked to provide answers to three 
statements regarding their views on politicians’ responsiveness, competence and integrity: 
“Politicians take into account the inhabitants’ viewpoints”, “Politicians are competent people 
knowing what they are doing” and “Politicians in my municipality set aside their personal 
interests when taking political decisions”. Factor analysis produced a unidimensional component 
explaining 80% of the variance in the set of items (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.80). In addition, a 
question about how well “the city council represents what people think” was also included as a 
separate variable to capture political representativeness. 
Second, two variables are used for analyzing the governmental output dimension. Respondents 
were asked to state on a ten-point scale whether they were satisfied or not satisfied with the way 
the local authority has handled all types of local challenges. They were also asked to assess how 
satisfied they were with municipal services in general: “The municipal is responsible for different 
areas within health care, education, culture, sport facilities and transport. All in all, do you think 
the municipal services are very good, pretty good, less good or not good.”. 
Third, the questionnaire included questions focusing specifically on support for local road tolls in 
the region, as well as satisfaction with quality of various aspects within transport. Respondents 
were allowed to answer ‘don’t know’ on the majority of these questions. 
Fourth, a variable showing in which municipality the respondents lived was also included in 
order to capture contextual differences. The model also includes questions about how well 
respondents felt they were about local politics and how often they read local or regional news. 
Socio-demographic variables included information about age, sex and education. 
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Lastly, individuals supporting a party in power are classified as “winners” while those supporting 
other parties, or who did not support any political party at all, are classified as “losers”. 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive overview of satisfaction with democracy at the local and national level 
Table 2 shows the distributions of satisfaction with how local democracy works in the three 
municipalities of interest, as well as a general development on satisfaction with democracy for all 
municipalities in Norway between 2007 and 2011. Support for local road tolls in the three 
selected cities is also shown. 
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Table 2. Developments and contextual differences for satisfaction with democracy and acceptance of road tolls 
  Oslo (2017) Bergen (2017) Trondheim 
(2017) 
Local 
democracy 
(2007) 5 
Local democracy 
(2011) 
Satisfaction with 
local democracy 
Not at all 7 7 6 2 2 
Not very 20 31 23 16 12 
Fairly 67 58 61 75 71 
Very  7 5 10 6 15 
N 896 964 730 657 1027 
Support for local 
toll roads 
Very negative  14 15 16   
Quite negative 16 21 21   
Neither positive 
nor negative 
27 28 27   
Quite positive 30 25 27   
Very positive  14 10 9   
N 990 1078 816   
 
If we look first at the right side of the table containing the distribution of satisfaction with local 
democracy across all municipalities, it is evident that the share of people who are satisfied with 
the way local democracy works has increased between 2007 and 2011. It is important to note in 
this regard that the local election in 2011 took place only a few weeks after the terrorist attack in 
Oslo and at Utøya on July 22. Trust in political institutions and politicians increased after the 
attack (Bergh and Christensen, 2013). Compared to the national average in 2011, however, 
citizens in Oslo, Bergen and Trondheim are clearly more dissatisfied in 2017. Unfortunately 
there are no data for analyzing how satisfaction with local democracy has on average developed 
since 2011. In general, however, the share of citizens being satisfied is nonetheless higher 
compared to the average level in most other European countries (Sanders et al., 2014; Rose and 
Pettersen, 2009a). 
The table also illustrates the importance of contextual differences when it comes to support for 
local toll roads. Despite long experiences with toll roads, the population is rather split in all three 
municipalities. Between 30 and 37% are negative, while the share of people that are positive 
varies between 35 and 44%. The share of people who are negative is higher in Bergen and 
Trondheim than it is in Oslo. Consequently, there are differences in the level of support between 
the three municipalities. 
It is beyond the scope of this article to go into great detail explaining these differences in support 
for tolls in the three cities. The aim here is to analyze how lack of support potentially influences 
satisfaction with local democracy regardless of the reasons for being positive or negative. Within 
the literature on acceptance of public policies, however, attitudes to congestion pricing is linked 
to a variety of factors (see, for instance, Eliasson, 2017). At least three key contextual differences 
may partly explain the variation in support between the cities: (1) the level of congestion, (2) the 
general costs of tolls, and (3) when changes in the toll cordon system occurred. Oslo has 
relatively more congestion than Bergen and Trondheim. This may well have influenced an 
understanding of the need for tolls to regular traffic and to finance transportation infrastructure. 
                                                 
5 Data regarding satisfaction with democracy in 2007 and 2011 are gathered from “Lokalvalgundesøkelsen 2007” 
and “Lokalvalgundersøkelsen 2011” respectively. The Institute for Social Research and Statistics Norway made the 
data available, but are not responsible for any of the analyses or interpretations. 
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In addition, Trondheim introduced new toll stations within the city in 2014, and Bergen had an 
increase in toll charges in 2012. Raising the tolls can potentially decrease the level of public 
support inasmuch as the costs for people increase. The same argument applies to the cost for 
passing the toll cordon. In 2017, the price for driving through a toll station was 25 NOK (49 
NOK during rush hours) in Bergen, 9 NOK (22 NOK during rush hours) in Trondheim and 34 
NOK in Oslo. The level of toll is therefore significantly lower in Trondheim compared to the 
other cities. 
In the following further empirical analyses are divided into two sections. In the first section, 
which is based on Fig. 1, variation in the level of satisfaction with local democracy is analyzed 
controlling for other well-known explanatory factors already identified in the literature: This is 
done by means of ordinary least square regression. The second part analyses the indirect effects 
and proportions of the total effects being mediated through the input and output dimensions. 
4.2 Model results – direct effects 
Five models are presented here. The first includes individual, contextual and knowledge variables 
(control, H6 and H7), the second adds variables concerning the input dimension for political 
legitimacy (H1 and H2), the third model includes the govern-mental output dimension (H3 and 
H4), the fourth adds specific variables about the use of instruments and quality of services within 
the transport sector (H4 and H5), while the fifth model includes all variables. The regression 
analyses make it possible to compare the relative importance of variables added at each step by 
comparing differences in the adjusted R square. 
Looking first at model 1 in Table 3, one can see that individual factors have the expected effect 
on satisfaction with democracy. The model also provides support for the winner and loser 
hypothesis; citizens who support the parties in a majority coalition are more likely to be satisfied 
with how local democracy works (H6). However, in contrast to existing literature, the model 
does not show any effect of feeling well informed about local politics or having higher education. 
In other words, neither H7a nor H7b receives support in the analysis. 
Turning to the contextual factors, residents in Bergen are less satisfied with democracy. This can 
be related to the argument from Leiter and Clark (2015) and Bowler and Karp (2004) regarding 
the importance of valence with respect to the impact of governing parties on satisfaction with 
democracy. Local politics in Bergen has been more subject to instances of political turmoil 
compared to the other municipalities.6 Potentially this can partly explain differences in local 
satisfaction. The size of the effects, however, is in general small. The most important factors in 
model 1 are age (−0.14) and being classified as a winner (0.24). 
In model 2, which serves to highlight the input dimension, all new variables are statistically 
significant. For citizens who agree with the statement that the city council represents what 
people think well satisfaction with democracy is greater (by a standard deviation of 0.15) than 
people who disagree. The index regarding attitudes about politicians also has a clear impact. 
Satisfaction with local democracy increases when politicians are regarded as competent and 
sensitive for citizens’ viewpoints. In fact, in all models, the index concerning politicians has the 
largest impact on satisfaction with local democracy. An increase in R square from 0.10 to 0.39 
clearly indicates the importance of input legitimacy for democratic satisfaction compared to 
individual and contextual factors. These results are thus in line with H1 and H2. 
                                                 
6 For instance, the former mayor was investigated for corruption. There have also been fierce discussions about 
future policies for light rail and whether the municipality should introduce congestion charging. See Pellegata and 
Memoli (2018). Corruption and satisfaction with democracy: the conditional role of electoral disproportionality and 
ballot control. European Political Science Review, 1–24. for an overview of corruption and its relationship to 
satisfaction with democracy. 
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Turning to model 3, we can furthermore look at how the governmental output dimension 
influences satisfaction with democracy. Two variables are meant to capture the output 
dimension. The first variable measures the effect of citizens being satisfied with how local 
authorities have handled local challenges. The second variable measures the effect of being 
dissatisfied with municipal services in general. Moving one standard deviation with respect to 
being satisfied with how local authorities have handled local challenges increases satisfaction with 
democracy by 0.43 standard deviations, while being dissatisfied with municipal services reduces 
satisfaction by 0.14. The size of these effects and the increase in R square demonstrate that the 
output dimension is a key factor for explaining satisfaction with local democracy. Thus, as 
expected, the results support H3. 
Model 4 expands the perspective to analyze the effects of being positive or negative towards use 
of a restrictive transportation policy instrument, as well as satisfaction with two transportation 
issues. In this case the model shows a relationship between support for a restrictive instruments 
and satisfaction with local democracy. Citizens being negative towards tolls are significantly more 
dissatisfied with local democracy. This confirms the assumption regarding a relationship between 
the choice of policy instruments and governmental legitimacy. The size of these effects, however, 
is rather low (0.15). In addition, model 4 shows how satisfaction with transportation policies 
influence satisfaction with democracy. Here the model demonstrates that transport services are 
relevant and citizens who are less satisfied with quality are less satisfied with democracy. The 
results then support H4 and H5. 
Lastly, model 5 includes all variables. Just as in the previous models, the analysis supports 
hypothesis 1–6. The coefficients have the same direction and have the same significance levels. 
This serves to confirm that individual factors, in combination with the input and output 
dimensions, as well as specific transport issues, influence satisfaction with democracy. However, 
the model also shows that there are differences regarding the relative effect of some variables. 
Especially factors measuring the output and input dimensions, as well as specific transport 
factors, are reduced when all variables are included (model 5). This indicates that these factors 
are correlated not only with the dependent variable, but also with one or more of the other 
independent variables. It can thus be an empirically argument for conducting the mediation 
analysis in Section 4.3. 
In model 5 an interaction term is also added since it possible that the effect of being dissatisfied 
with the local toll cordon system is dependent on how satisfied individuals are with the way local 
politicians are perceived to handle local challenges in general. Previous research has for instance 
documented that acceptance of some policy instruments is related to their perceived effects 
(Börjesson et al., 2012). In the present case the results in model 5 indeed show that the potential 
negative effects of opposing the local toll cordon system can partly be offset if citizens are 
satisfied with the way politicians handle local challenges more generally. 
When all variables are included in the model, the adjusted R square increases to 0.46. It is 
difficult to compare the adjusted R square with results in other studies due to differences in 
approach and the variables used. The bulk of studies have focused on differences in satisfaction 
with democracy between countries at the national level and not on the local level. The explained 
variance in the present case, however, is relatively high compared to some studies (Anderson and 
Guillory, 1997) and is at roughly the same level compared to others (Armingeon and Guthmann, 
2014). 
Lastly, some authors have argued that democratic effectiveness is more important for democratic 
satisfaction than ideological congruence on the input side (Dahlberg and Holmberg, 2014). The 
models in this paper do not support such a conclusion. The differences in R2 rather suggest an 
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almost equal importance between the input and output dimension for satisfaction with 
democracy. 
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Table 3. Direct effects on satisfaction with local democracy. OLS regression. Standardized B (std.error).  
Significant values: ***=0, **=.001, *=0.01 
 
Variables Model 1 (individual and contextual factors) 
Model 2 (individual 
and contextual + 
input dimension) 
Model 3 (individual 
and contextual + 
output dimension) 
Model 4 (individual 
and contextual + 
transport issues) 
Model 5 (all 
factors) 
Constant            
Age  -0.14 (0.00) *** -0.09 (0.00) *** -0.12 (0.00) *** -0.08 (0.00) *** -0.09 (0.00) *** 
Sex (1=male) -0.02 (0.03)   0.01 (0.02)   -0.01 (0.02)   0.01 (0.02)  0.02 (0.02)   
Education 0.04 (0.3) * -0.01 (0.02)   0.01 (0.02)   0.03 (0.03) . 0.00 (0.02)   
Bergen (Oslo=reference category) -0.07 (0.03) *** -0.05 (0.03) ** -0.07 (0.03) *** -0.03 (0.03)  -0.04 (0.03) * 
Trondheim (Oslo=reference category) -0.00 (0.04)   -0.01 (0.03)   -0.04 (0.03) * 0.00 (0.03)  -0.03 (0.03)   
Reading local news (H7a/b) 0.01 (0.04)   0.00 (0.03)   -0.00 (0.03)   0.00 (0.03)  -0.00 (0.03)   
Political informed (subjectively) (H7a/b) 0.07 (0.03) *** 0.01 (0.02)   0.03 (0.02) * 0.06 (0.03) *** 0.02 (0.02) . 
Winner (H6) 0.26 (0.03) *** 0.08 (0.02) *** 0.12 (0.02) *** 0.17 (0.03) *** 0.06 (0.02) *** 
Politicians (H1)     0.46 (0.02) ***       0.28 (0.02) *** 
City council represents what people think well (H2)     0.15 (0.03) ***       0.11 (0.02) *** 
Satisfied with handling of local challenges (H3)         0.43 (0.00) ***   0.17 (0.00) *** 
Dissatisfied with municipal services (H4)         -0.14 (0.03) ***   -0.04 (0.03) * 
Dissatisfied with “city-development” (H4)             -0.27 (0.03) *** -0.13 (0.03) *** 
Dissatisfied with car accessibility (H4)             -0.17 (0.03) *** -0.06 (0.03) *** 
Dissatisfied with tolls (H5)             -0.15 (0.03) *** -0.12 (0.07) ** 
Satisfied with handling of local challenges*toll roads (H5)               0.09 (0.01) * 
Adjusted R square 0.11   0.39   0.36   0.27 0.46  
N 2548  2455  2470  2476 2337  
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4.3 Mediation analysis  
In the previous section, the direct effects of different independent variables for satisfaction with 
local democracy were analyzed. In this section, the aim is to gain more insights into how 
transport policies and transport quality can influence satisfaction with democracy by identifying 
mechanisms. Following Imai et al. (2011), a mediation approach is used to investigate how 
transport factors may potentially have an impact in both the input and output models used to 
explain variation in satisfaction with democracy.  
Empirical results presented in Table 3 suggested a mediation effect. But every bit as important 
one can theoretically argue that perceived transport quality and support for selected transport 
policy instruments are relevant in the input and output models used in this article. Easton (1957), 
for example, wrote about the feedback mechanisms that are likely to exist between the input and 
output dimensions of support for a political system. In Fig. 2 this would imply that citizens 
opposing local toll roads could be more inclined to think that politicians are less competent or 
that politicians are less likely to consider the inhabitants’ viewpoints. Politicians could also be 
blamed if citizens are not pleased with transport accessibility or if they disagree with local land-
use development policies. People opposing local toll roads could also be less satisfied with the 
perceived character of policy decisions by arguing that tolls are unfair, inefficient or unnecessary 
for solving local challenges. Being dissatisfied with the quality within different transport issues 
could also naturally influence citizens’ evaluation of governmental performance. Consequently, 
the subsequent analysis will focus on mediation effects on both dimensions. 
Figure 2 illustrates the logic of the mediation analysis. Results presented previously in Table 2 
documented the direct effect of each variable. By comparison, mediation analysis serves to 
identity mediated (indirect) effects. In the following model 5 from Table 3 is used in all of the 
analyses, and the results presented are limited to the average causal mediation effect (ACME), the 
total effect and the proportion mediated effect for each transport variable. 
Figure 2. Model specification for direct and indirect effects.   
  
Results found in Table 4 suggest a mediation effect (ACME) for each independent variable. As is 
evident, being dissatisfied with tolls or being dissatisfied with the quality of services for car 
accessibility and city development reduces satisfaction with local democracy, and it does so via 
both the input and output dimensions. The results therefore indicate a more complex 
relationship between the variables since they imply pathways in addition to those reflected by the 
simple direct effects. In other words, the results suggest that transport policies and perceived 
transport quality influence satisfaction with how local democracy works both directly and 
indirectly. In particular, as the findings in Table 4 make apparent, they indirectly influence two of 
the factors having the relatively largest effect on the dependent variable. The size of the effects, 
however, is low, varying between an average of 0.01 and 0.04. 
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Coefficients found in the columns for proportion mediated furthermore show the importance of 
the average causal mediating effects by analyzing how much of the total effect is transmitted via 
the mediators. Thus, when comparing the relative importance of the mediating effects, the table 
shows that, on average, the proportion mediated varies between 0.10 and 0.47. Not being 
satisfied with tolls has the largest proportion mediated, but this is in large part related to the 
lower total effect of this variable. 
Table 4. Mediation analysis7. N=2354  
  Politicians Satisfied with handling of local 
challenges (output) 
  ACME Total 
effect 
Prop. 
mediated 
ACME Total 
effect 
Prop. 
mediated 
Not satisfied 
"city-
development" 
-0.03*** -0.24*** 0.13*** -0.03*** -0.24*** 0.14*** 
Not satisfied car 
accessibility 
-.04*** -0.14*** 0.28*** -0.01 -0.10*** 0.10*** 
Not satisfied 
with tolls 
-0.03*** -0.07** 0.47**  -0.02*** -.05* .30* 
 Significant values: ***=0, **=0.001, *=0.01, .=0.05  
 
5. Conclusion 
This article contributes to the literature by analyzing how restrictive instruments and perceived 
transport quality potentially influence political legitimacy at the local level. It consequently sheds 
some light on an issue that, according to Marsden and Reardon (2017) has been largely ignored. 
The results also contribute to the theoretical discussion about satisfaction with local democracy, 
what constitutes quality of government (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008), and how citizens evaluate 
governmental performance (Olsen, 2017). However, it is important to note that the analysis is 
solely limited to regime performance. The analysis does not take into account the full range of 
factors that constitute the other dimensions of political legitimacy. 
Results from both regression and mediation analyses suggest a relationship between 
transportation policies and satisfaction with how democracy works at the local level. Introducing 
restrictive measures, such as toll roads, can decrease citizens’ evaluations of both politicians, and 
their evaluation of governmental performance. Although the results suggest only small effects on 
satisfaction with local democracy, these results nevertheless underline the importance of 
understanding how citizens are affected by specific policy instruments, as well as showing that 
ideological proximity and performance are multi-dimensional aspects (see, for example Kim, 
2009; Ezrow and Xezonakis, 2011; Stecker and Tausendpfund, 2016). 
There are several policy and research relevant implications stemming from these results. First, 
they highlight the importance of keeping an eye on public support. Even though previous studies 
on congestion pricing have shown that the level of opposition is reduced after it has been 
implemented, this study illustrates that there still is a significant portion of the population who 
are negative despite long-term familiarity with road tolls. This is especially relevant when taking 
into consideration that citizens who are dissatisfied with regime performance might be more 
likely to call for radical changes (Bernauer and Vatter, 2012) or the policies may erode beliefs 
about democratic principles (Norris, 1999). The potential negative political consequences arising 
from disgruntled citizens, however, are de-batable. It can be argued that dissatisfied citizens 
strengthen democratic government insofar as they become more politically engaged (see Norris, 
                                                 
7 Bootstrapping, with 1000 simulations, is used in the mediation analysis.   
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1999). For instance, a new party in Norway, The peoples’ movement against more tolls, for 
instance, aims at competing in the next local election in 2019. The party was first established in 
Stavanger - Norway’s fourth largest city- because of decisions about increasing tolls and the 
introduction of congestion pricing. Such a development can be of increased importance 
inasmuch as all levels of government increasingly rely on tolls for financing infrastructure 
projects and for reaching policy goals aimed at reducing emissions from the transport sector. 
The Norwegian Parliament has developed a zero-growth target which means that there should 
be no growth in personal car traffic. The national government therefore requires that 
municipalities shall have zero-growth in personal car traffic if they are to receive co-financing for 
local transport infrastructure. Restrictive measures such as tolls and parking policies then 
become essential tools. 
Second, this study gives some support to the claim that instruments influence the political 
support that government enjoys (Salamon, 2002). This is especially relevant considering the fact 
that some studies suggest that it can be difficult for citizens to evaluate political performance and 
policy outcomes based on which party is in office (Holbein and Dynes, 2018). Thus, holding 
local governments accountable through retrospective voting based on objective evaluation of 
what local government achieves is challenging. Policy instruments, on the other hand, are 
something which politicians, arguably, control to a larger degree. The toolbox within the field of 
transport, for instance, contains a multitude of options varying from tolls, congestion pricing, 
parking policies and land-use policies. These are policies that to varying degrees are visible and 
foster disagreement along the ideological spectrum. From such a perspective, alternative policy 
instruments may well constitute one factor influencing citizens’ evaluations underlying public 
support. In this respect future studies might do well to consider how opposition to or support 
for a multitude of different instruments, both within and across various policy sectors, influence 
political legitimacy. If so it would then become possible to study how the accumulation of 
support and opposition towards different policy instruments influences political legitimacy. 
Third, taking into account context and time, the analysis shows that the level of satisfaction with 
democracy and the support for restrictive instruments varies between the three selected 
municipalities. This indicates the necessity of thinking about local contexts when considering 
implementing restrictive measures. The impact on political legitimacy can be partly dependent on 
the level of resistance within the city at a specific point in time. It is possible, for instance, that 
the consequences for local and national satisfaction with democracy are larger immediately after 
they are implemented. The same logic may also apply to instances when authorities decide to 
increase the costs for passing toll stations. This means that it is not irrelevant when in an election 
circle, for example, authorities decide to implement toll roads or congestion pricing. However, it 
is important to note that implementing restrictive measures also can increase satisfaction with 
democracy insofar as governments are perceived to perform better in terms of e.g. ameliorating 
problems associated with emission or congestion. These results also underline the need for 
understanding strategies to increase acceptance (Eliasson and Jonsson, 2011). 
Fourth, previous research has argued that legitimacy at lower levels of government influences 
legitimacy at higher levels (Vetter, 2007). From such a perspective the performance of local 
authorities is relevant for the national level. It is possible, for example, that opposition to local 
tolls may also have an impact on satisfaction with democracy at the national level. Such an 
argument illustrates the interdependence between different levels of government. 
Fifth, empirically this article has analyzed the effect of two contrasting theoretical perspectives 
with respect to satisfaction with democracy – one perspective which emphasizes the importance 
of feeling represented and having competent politicians, a second which highlights the 
significance of governmental performance. The results provide support for both perspectives 
and are in line with the findings from (Dahlberg et al., 2015). Changes in explained variance 
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indicates that both the input and output models contribute significantly to satisfaction with 
democracy. 
Further research regarding these issues is necessary. This article uses cross sectional data for 
analyzing the relationship between specific policy instruments and satisfaction with democracy at 
the local level. The findings suggest a correlation between introduction of these instruments and 
satisfaction with democracy. The dataset used, however, unfortunately allows little room for 
using other research designs allowing for an analysis of causality. Further studies are therefore 
needed for evaluating the direction of causality between the variables. Explicating the causal 
relationship between political legitimacy and voter turnout or voting behavior would, for 
example, be especially useful in understanding the political implications of transportation policies 
for political legitimacy. Other studies could also use designs involving before and after 
implementation analyses of e.g. tolls, congestion pricing, parking policies or implementing car-
free areas in order to make better claims about causal effects and to study the short-term 
consequences of introducing restrictive instruments. Studies could furthermore analyze the 
importance of issue priorities for evaluating governmental performance at both the local and the 
national level, go into further detail with respect to how citizens evaluate governmental 
performance, and analyze how a toll cordon system influences satisfaction with democracy for 
citizens living in surrounding municipalities affected by tolls. Many issues, in short, remain on the 
agenda for further research. 
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Table A.1 Descriptive statistics 
 Variables Mean SD Min Max Proportion 'don't know'  
Age 44 16.9 18 89 0 
Sex (1=male)  0.5  0 1 0 
Education 3.7 1.1 1 5 0 
Newspaper reading 2.13 1.15 1 4 35 
Political informed 3.16 0.8 1 5 43 
Perception of local politicians (index) 2.67 0.66 1 4 635 
Quality of public services are poor 2.98 0.87 1 5 351 
City council represents citizens’ viewpoints well 2.52 0.7 1 4 836 
Not satisfied with local services 2.22 0.61 1 4 343 
Satisfied with land use development 2.71 0.63 1 4 534 
Satisfied with car accessibility 2.78 0.63 1 4 477 
Supports local toll roads 2.99 1.22 1 5 196 
 
 
  
 23 
 
Table A.2. Variables overview 
Variable name Question formulation Categorization  Recoded values 
Education Highest finished education 1 = Primary 
school, 5= 
University/college 
four years or 
more 
0 = Primary 
school or high 
school, 1= 
University or 
college degree 
Political 
knowledge 
How well informed do you feel you are 
about what happens in local politics in 
your municipality? 
Four-point scale 
1=Not informed, 
4=Very well 
informed 
0=Not informed, 
1=Informed 
Frequency of 
newspaper reading 
How often would you say you read local 
or regional news? 
1=Daily, 2=4-6 
times a week, 
3=1-3 times a 
week, 4=Fewer  
0=Seldom or 
never 1= At least 
1-3 times a week  
Winner One can feel larger identification to 
some parties than others. For the time 
being, which party do you feel closest?  
All parties 
represented at the 
local level. 
Included “none” 
as an option 
0=Not identifying 
to any party in 
government 
1=Feel 
identification to a 
party in 
government 
Satisfaction with 
local democracy 
How satisfied are you with the way local 
democracy works in your municipality? 
1=Not at all 
satisfied, 2=Fairly 
dissatisfied 3= 
Fairy satisfied 
4=Very satisfied 
1=Not at all 
satisfied, 2=Fairly 
dissatisfied 3= 
Fairy satisfied 
4=Very satisfied 
Satisfaction with 
municipal services 
The municipal is responsible for 
different areas within health care, 
education, culture, sport facilities and 
transport. All in all, do you think the 
municipal services are…. 
Four-point scale 
from ‘not 
satisfied’ to ‘very 
satisfied’  
1=Not at all 
satisfied or fairly 
dissatisfied 0 = 
Fairy satisfied or 
very satisfied  
Perceptions of 
local politicians 
(index) 
Politicians in my municipality are 
sensitive for the inhabitants’ viewpoints  
Politicians in my municipality are skilled 
people usually knowing what they are 
doing 
Likert scale 
 
Likert scale 
 
Likert scale (1 = 
‘do not agree’ and 
5 = ‘agree’) 
 
Likert scale (1= 
‘do not agree’ and 
5 = ‘agree’) 
Political 
representation 
How well does the city council reflect the 
viewpoints of inhabitants?  
Four-point scale 1=Very or quite 
well, 0= not at all 
or quite little  
Political challenges All things considered, how satisfied or 
dissatisfied are you with the way the 
municipality has handled challenges 
facing the municipality?  
Scale from 0-10.  Scale from 0-10. 
(0 = very 
dissatisfied and 10 
= very satisfied)  
Satisfied with local 
services 
We would also know how satisfied or 
dissatisfied you are with the following 
1=Not at all 
satisfied, 2=Fairly 
dissatisfied 3= 
1=Not at all 
satisfied or fairly 
dissatisfied, 0= 
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services …”accessibility for cars”, “city 
development”  
Fairy satisfied 
4=Very satisfied 
fairly satisfied or 
very satisfied  
Toll roads How positive or negative are you 
towards the toll roads in your 
city?  
Likert scale 1= Quite negative 
or very negative 
0= Quite positive, 
very positive or 
neither positive or 
negative 
 
 
